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Abstract We propose a multi-bit leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme us-
ing multivariate polynomial evaluations. The security of the scheme depends on the
hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem. For homomorphic multipli-
cation, the scheme uses a polynomial based technique that does not require relin-
earization (and key switching). The noise associated with the ciphertext increases
only linearly with every multiplication.
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1 Introduction
Homomorphic encryption is the ability to evaluate mathematical functions on en-
crypted data without decryption. In other words, if φ denotes a function to be eval-
uated on the plaintexts m1 and m2, then homomorphic encryption is the ability to
compute φ(m1,m2) from their respective encryptions Enc(m1) and Enc(m2) without
the knowledge of m1 and m2. An encryption scheme is said to be fully homomor-
phic if functions of arbitrary complexity can be evaluated on the ciphertexts. If an
encryption scheme can evaluate functions of only limited complexity, then it is said
to be somewhat homomorphic.
Following the initial construction of a Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
scheme [17], similar schemes were proposed in [33,31,8,18,20,19,12,10]. In such
schemes, a somewhat homomorphic scheme is converted to a fully homomorphic
one using bootstrapping. Bootstrapping relies on additional hardness assumptions.
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As an alternative, a different set of schemes were proposed [9,6,4,21] based on the
hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem. In these LWE-based schemes,
a (leveled) fully homomorphic encryption scheme can be obtained from a somewhat
homomorphic one without bootstrapping.
The starting point of LWE-based schemes such as [9,6,4] is the initial cryptosys-
tem proposed in [28,29]. The ciphertext and the secret key are vectors of size O(n)
and the plaintext is recovered by computing their inner product. Homomorphic mul-
tiplication is performed by tensoring two ciphertexts. The corresponding secret key
is the tensor product of the original secret key with itself. As a result, homomorphic
multiplication squares the size of the ciphertext. This blow up in ciphertext size can
be scaled back down to its original size by relinearizing the ciphertext after multipli-
cation. Relinearization is the process of multiplying the ciphertext by an O˜(n2)× n
matrix and the evaluation key must consist of L such matrices in order to evaluate
a circuit of depth L. In [9,6], homomorphic multiplication squares the noise and is
countered using a noise management technique called modulus switching introduced
in [9]. In [4], the noise grows linearly and a leveled FHE scheme can be obtained
without modulus switching.
Another approach to construct an LWE-based leveled FHE scheme without boot-
strapping was proposed in [21] using the approximate eigenvector method. It avoids
the expensive relinearization step and homomorphic addition and multiplication are
matrix addition and multiplication respectively. It entirely removes the need for an
evaluation key and the noise in evaluated ciphertexts can be controlled using a tech-
nique called flattening. Further, ring-LWE variants of this scheme were developed in
[15,11].
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a multi-bit leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme
based on multivariate polynomial evaluations. Here, multiple plaintext bits are en-
crypted in a single ciphertext. As in [32,5,26,20], homomorphic addition and multi-
plication can be performed simultaneously on multiple plaintext bits. Schemes with
this property include the ones described in [32,5,26,20]. We introduce the proposed
scheme as a symmetric key scheme and then extend it to a public key variant. The
security of the scheme depends on the hardness of the LWE problem.
The proposed scheme is based on the evaluation of multivariate polynomials of
a secret ideal I. A ciphertext is obtained by evaluating a random polynomial in I
on a set of distinct points and adding scaled plaintext bits to a number of these
evaluations corrupted with noise. Multiplication in the scheme is performed by eval-
uating a bilinear map on the ciphertexts. This map is represented by a 3-way tensor
and is given as the public evaluation key for multiplication. The aim here is to use
the multiplicative property of the polynomial ring to perform homomorphic multi-
plication. Unlike other LWE-based schemes, homomorphic multiplication does not
increase the size of the ciphertexts. Therefore, there is no need for relinearization.
The noise associated with the ciphertexts increases only linearly with each homo-
morphic operation. Hence, a leveled FHE scheme can be obtained without modulus
switching. The per gate computation of the scheme is O(n3 · L2) where L denotes
the multiplicative depth of the circuit.
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An attempt to use polynomials for homomorphic multiplication was made in
[14]. However, this process required an increase in the ciphertext size with each
multiplication.
1.2 Paper Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the prelimi-
naries for the proposed work. In Section 3, we propose a leveled fully homomorphic
encryption scheme based on the hardness of the LWE problem. Finally, in Section
4, we discuss the public key variant of the scheme.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
λ denotes the security parameter. The set of integers and natural numbers are de-
noted by Z and N respectively. R and Q denote the set of real and rational numbers
respectively. Given a set S, x $← S means that x is sampled uniformly at random
from S. The cardinality of S is denoted by |S|. For a real number x, bxc, dxe and
bxe denote the rounding of x down, up or to the nearest integer. For a prime q, Zq
denotes a finite field of cardinality q and its elements are represented by the integers
in the interval
[− ⌊ q2⌋ , ⌊ q2⌋]. We use ‘log’ to denote logarithm to the base 2. For some
a ∈ Z, we use (a mod q) and [a]q interchangeably to denote the modular reduction
of a by q into the interval (−q/2, q/2] ∩ Z. A vector v is usually a row vector unless
stated otherwise. We use (v,w) to denote the vector [v ‖ w]. The one norm of a
vector v is denoted by ‖v‖1 and the infinity norm by ‖v‖∞. The inner product of
two vectors v1,v2 is denoted using 〈v1,v2〉 := v1vT2 . The notation v1  v2 denotes
the component-wise product of v1 and v2. A function negl(x) : N → R is called
negligible if, for every c ∈ N, there exists an integer nc such that |negl(x)| < 1xc for
all x > nc. We write negl(·) to denote an arbitrary negligible function.
2.2 Learning with Errors
Learning with Errors is the problem of solving a system of noisy linear equations over
Zq. The LWE problem was introduced in [28] and is an extension of the Learning
Parity with Noise (LPN) problem to a higher modulus. It can also be seen as the
problem of decoding random linear codes. The LWE problem can be defined as
follows.
Definition 1 (Learning With Errors). For positive integers q, n ∈ N, let X be
a probability distribution on Z and s be a secret vector in Znq , chosen uniformly at
random. Given polynomially many samples of the form (ai, bi) ∈ Znq ×Zq where ai is
sampled uniformly at random from Znq and bi := 〈ai, s〉+ei (mod q) for some ei $← X ,
the search variant of the learning with errors problem, denoted by LWEn,q,X , is to
output the vector s ∈ Znq with overwhelming probability. The decisional variant of
the problem denoted by DLWEn,q,X is to distinguish LWE samples from samples
chosen uniformly at random from Znq × Zq. The DLWE problem has been shown to
be equivalent to the LWE problem [29].
4 Uddipana Dowerah1, Srinivasan Krishnaswamy1
The noise in the LWE problem is usually sampled from a discrete Gaussian
distribution.
Definition 2 (Discrete Gaussian distribution). For α > 0 and q = q(n), Xα is a
discrete Gaussian distribution on Z with mean zero and standard deviation σ := αq
if for an integer x in (−q/2, q/2]
Pr [x $← Xα] :=
exp
(−pix2/σ2)∑
y∈(−q/2,q/2]
exp (−y2/σ2) (1)
A distribution over the integers is said to be bounded when it takes values within
a specific interval.
Definition 3 (B-bounded distribution). A distribution X over the set of integers
is said to be B-bounded if
Pr [|x| > B | x $← X ] = negl(n) (2)
2.2.1 Hardness of LWE
Given that X in LWE is a discretized Gaussian distribution with σ ≥ 2√n, sta-
tistically indistinguishable from a B-bounded distribution for some appropriate B,
there exists a quantum reduction of LWE to approximating the decisional Shortest
Vector Problem (GapSVPγ)[28,29] where γ is called the approximation factor and
depends on the ratio q/B (γ = (q/B) · O˜(n)). Further, [25] and [7] gave classical
reductions of LWE from the worst-case lattice problems for an exponential modulus
and a polynomial modulus respectively. The best-known algorithms for GapSVPγ
require 2Ω˜(n/log γ) time [30,24].
The hardness of LWE can be summarized in terms of the following theorem which
summarizes the results in [29],[25] and [7]. We state the results in terms of the bound
B as stated in [4,21].
Theorem 1 ([29,25,7]). Let q = q(n) be prime and let B ≥ ω(logn) · √n. Then,
there exists an efficiently sampleable B-bounded distribution X such that if there is
an efficient algorithm that solves the average-case DLWEn,q,X problem, then
– There exists an efficient quantum algorithm for solving GapSVPO˜(n·q/B) on any
n-dimensional lattice [29].
– If q ≥ 2n/2, then there exists an efficient classical algorithm that solves the
GapSVPO˜(n·q/B) problem on any n-dimensional lattice [25].
– There exists an efficient classical algorithm that solves the GapSVPO˜(n·q/B) prob-
lem on any lattice of dimension
√
n [7].
2.3 Tensors
Let φT : V1×V2× · · ·×Vn →W be a multilinear map, where V1, . . . ,Vn and W are
finite-dimensional vector spaces. Given fixed bases for the vector spaces, φT can be
represented by a multidimensional array T called a tensor. The order of a tensor is
the number of indices required to represent a component of the array.
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Slices in a tensor are two-dimensional sections generated by fixing all indices
except two. In a third-order tensor, slices generated by keeping the last index fixed
are called frontal slices. These are analogous to matrices. Therefore a third-order
tensor T I1×I2×I3 is an I3 array of I1 × I2 matrices.
A Bilinear map is a function φ : V1 ×V2 → V3 that takes two elements from two
vector spaces V1 and V2 and maps it to an element of a third vector space V3 such
that it is linear in each of its elements. An order-3 tensor T can be used to represent
a bilinear map φ : V×V → V, on the vector space V. If dim(V) = n and {b1, . . . , bn}
denotes a basis for V, then
φ(bi, bj) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
Tijk · bk (3)
For a fixed k, Tk := (Tijk)1≤i,j≤n represents a unique matrix of order n × n. For
1 ≤ k ≤ n, Tk forms the frontal slices of the tensor T . The bilinear map φ then acts
on two arbitrary vectors v1 = [v1,1 v2,1 · · · vn,1],v2 = [v1,2 v2,2 · · · vn,2] ∈ V as
φ(v1,v2) =
n∑
i,j=1
vi,1φ(bi, bj)vj,2 =
[
v1T1v
T
2 . . . v1Tnv
T
2
]
(4)
2.3.1 The n-mode Product
The n-mode product defines multiplication of a tensor by a matrix. In general, the el-
ementwise n-mode product of a tensor T I1×I2×···×IN and a matrix MJ×In is defined
as:
(T ×M)i1i2···in−1jin+1···iN =
In∑
in=1
Ti1i2···in−1inin+1···iNMj,in (5)
The resultant tensor is of the order of (I1 × I2 × · · · × In−1 × J × In+1 × · · · × IN ).
3 The Proposed Leveled FHE Scheme
In this section, we discuss the construction of the leveled FHE scheme. For simplic-
ity, we present a private key variant of this scheme. Subsequently, we explain its
conversion to a public key scheme.
Let us consider an ideal I of the polynomial ring Zq[x1, . . . , xv], where q = q(λ)
is prime. For some r ∈ N, Zq[x1, . . . , xv]≤r is a vector space of dimension N :=
(
v+r
r
)
over Zq. Let I≤r denote the set of polynomials in I with degree ≤ r. Then, I≤r
is a subspace of Zq[x1, . . . , xv]≤r. Let n be the dimension of I≤r. It is very easy to
see that a polynomial f ∈ Zq[x1, . . . , xv]≤r evaluated at all points of Zvq generates
a vector in Zq
v
q . The set of such vectors obtained by evaluating all polynomials in
Zq[x1, . . . , xv]≤r constitutes an N -dimensional subspace of Zq
v
q . Similarly, evaluating
polynomials in I≤r gives us an n-dimensional subspace of Zq
v
q . Let {z1, . . . ,z`} be
` distinct points in Zvq for some ` ∈ N such that n < ` ≤ N . We can always choose
the ` points in such a way that at least n of them are linearly independent. Then,
evaluating polynomials in I≤r at (z1, . . . ,z`) gives us an n-dimensional subspace
SI≤r of Z`q. It can be summarized in terms of the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 For n, ` ∈ N with n < `, we can find ` distinct points {zi ∈ Zvq}1≤i≤`
such that evaluating polynomials in I≤r ⊆ Zq[x1, . . . , xv]≤r with dim(I≤r) := n at
(z1, . . . ,z`) spans an n-dimensional subspace of the vector space Z`q.
The set of evaluation points {z1, . . . ,z`} ∈ Zvq must satisfy the following condi-
tions:
1. Every vector in Z`q can be got by evaluating a polynomial in Zq[x1, . . . , xv]≤r at
(z1, . . . ,z`).
2. Every vector in Znq can be got by evaluating a polynomial in I≤r at (z1, . . . ,zn).
Because of the conditions imposed on (z1, . . . ,z`), we can find a basis
{s˜n+1, s˜n+2, . . . , s˜`} ∈ Z`q for (SI≤r )⊥ which has the following form:
s˜n+1 =
[
s1n+1 . . . s
n
n+1 1 0 . . . 0
]
s˜n+2 =
[
s1n+2 . . . s
n
n+2 0 1 . . . 0
]
...
s˜` =
[
s1` . . . s
n
` 0 0 . . . 1
]

(6)
Alternatively, SI≤r is the null space of the matrix
[
S I`−n
]
where S(i, j) = sjn+i
for 1 ≤ i ≤ `−n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. In this work, we assume that the choice of I and the
points z1, z2, . . . ,z` is such that the rows of the matrix S are linearly independent.
3.1 The Basic Encryption Scheme
We describe the basic encryption scheme in terms of the following algorithms. (The
homomorphic operations are described separately in Section 3.3.) The plaintext space
is {0, 1}`−n and the ciphertexts are vectors in Z`q. Further, we restrict ourselves to
the case where I is a principal ideal.
• Setup(1λ, 1L): Takes as input the security parameter λ and a parameter L and
outputs n = n(λ, L), ` = `(λ, L), modulus q = q(λ, L) and noise distribution X =
X (λ, L) such that |X | ≤ B. Here L denotes the depth of the circuit that can be
homomorphically evaluated. Let pi = (n, `, q,X ).
• KeyGen(pi): Choose two positive integers v and r′ such that n = (v+r′r′ ). Choose
integers r and rg such that r − rg = r′. Choose ` points, z1, . . . ,z`, from Zvq
such that the aforementioned conditions are satisfied. Choose a random polyno-
mial g(x1, . . . , xv) with degree rg in v variables such that g(z1), . . . , g(z`) are all
non zero. This polynomial acts as the generator of the ideal I. Generate a basis
BI≤r = (gh1, . . . , ghn) for the subspace I≤r by considering linearly independent
polynomials h1, . . . , hn having degree less than or equal to r′. A basis for SI≤r is
obtained by evaluating the polynomials in BI≤r at the points (z1, . . . ,z`). Construct
a basis of (SI≤r )⊥ (as given in Equation 6) which can be written in terms of the
matrix
[
S I`−n
]
where
S =

s1n+1 s
2
n+1 . . . s
n
n+1
s1n+2 s
2
n+2 . . . s
n
n+2
...
...
. . .
...
s1` s
2
` . . . s
n
`
 (7)
Fully Homomorphic Encryption based on Multivariate Polynomial Evaluation 7
Choose a matrix R ∈ Z`×`q such that R is of the form
R :=
[
Rn×n1 0n×(`−n)
R
(`−n)×n
2 I`−n
]
(8)
where R1 ∈ Zn×nq is a randomly chosen full rank matrix and the entries of R2 are
chosen uniformly at random from Zq. I`−n denotes the identity matrix of size `−n.
The secret key is sk = (S,R1,R2). The public parameters are n, ` and q.
• Encrypt(pi, sk,m): To encrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1}`−n, sample a vector y,
uniformly at random from Znq and a vector e = (0, en+1, . . . , e`) ∈ Z`q, where 0
denotes the zero vector of order n and each ej is chosen independently from the
distribution X for n + 1 ≤ j ≤ `. Let p be the vector given by p = (0,m) =
(0,mn+1, . . . ,m`) ∈ Z`q. If Senc :=
[
In −ST
] ∈ Zn×`q , then the ciphertext can be
computed as:
c =
(
p · ⌊ q2⌋+ y · Senc + e)R mod q ∈ Z`q (9)
Note that, y·Senc essentially represents the evaluation of a polynomial f ∈ I≤r at the
points (z1, . . . ,z`). This is because f(z1), . . . , f(zn) can take any value y ∈ Znq and
f(zj) for n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ ` can be expressed as a linear combination of f(z1), . . . , f(zn),
i.e.,
f(zj) = −
n∑
i=1
sij · f(zi) (mod q) (10)
• Decrypt(pi, sk, c): Let Sdec = R−1
[
S I`−n
]T ∈ Z`×(`−n)q . Given the ciphertext
c and the secret key sk, m can be recovered as
m =
⌊
1
bq/2c (c · Sdecmod q)
⌉
mod 2 (11)
3.1.1 Correctness of Decryption.
For correct decryption, the noise in the decryption process must be small. The de-
cryption process involves computing the inner product of the ciphertext with each
column of the matrix Sdec and reducing it modulo q. For each of these products,
the decryption function outputs 0 for the corresponding entry if the magnitude of
the inner product is < q/4 and 1 otherwise. In the following lemma, we analyze the
magnitude of the noise in decryption.
Lemma 2 Let q, n, `, |X | ≤ B be as described in the scheme. Let c =(
p · ⌊ q2⌋+ y · Senc + e)R mod q be the encryption of a message m ∈ {0, 1}`−n
under the key sk = (S,R1,R2). Then, for some e = (0, e˜) ∈ (0,X `−n) with
‖e‖∞ ≤ B, it holds that c · Sdec = m ·
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e˜ (mod q). Further, if B < bq/2c /2,
then m← Decrypt(sk, c).
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Proof If e˜ = (en+1, . . . , e`) ∈ Z`−nq where ej denotes the jth non-zero entry of e for
n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ `, then
c · Sdec =
(
p ·
⌊ q
2
⌋
+ y · Senc + e
)
R · Sdec (mod q)
= m ·
⌊ q
2
⌋
+ e˜ (mod q) (12)
If B < bq/2c /2, then for mj = 0 for any n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ ` , c ·Sdec(j) = ej (mod q)
where |e|j ≤ B < q/4. Hence, the decryption function outputs 0. Similarly, for
mj = 1, c · Sdec(j) =
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ ej (mod q) whose magnitude is > q/4 and hence, the
decryption function outputs 1. Therefore, if ‖e‖∞ ≤ B and B < bq/2c /2, then
m← Decrypt(sk, c). uunionsq
3.2 Security
The security of this scheme follows from Lemma 6.2 of [27]. The lemma is restated
as follows
Lemma 3 Let h, ` = poly(n). Choose A ← Zh×nq , Sˆ ← Z(`−n)×nq uniformly at
random and E ← X h×(`−n). If B = ASˆT + E, then (A,B) is computationally
indistinguishable from uniform over Zh×`q under the assumption that LWEn,q,X is
hard.
To prove the security of the proposed scheme we consider h = 1.
Lemma 4 Under the LWE assumption, given two distinct message vectors
m1,m2 ∈ {0, 1}`−n, if ` − n is O(1) there exists no efficient algorithm that can
distinguish between the distributions of the encryptions of m1 and m2. Moreover,
there exists no efficient algorithm that can distinguish the uniform distribution on
the set of encryptions of any given message from the uniform distribution on Z`q
Proof Note that the matrix R in the encryption process of the proposed scheme
is the product of the matrices R′ =
[
R1 0
0 I
]
and R′′ =
[
I 0
R2 I
]
. Therefore, the
encryption of a message m is given as
c =
(
p ·
⌊ q
2
⌋
+ y · Senc + e
)
R′R′′
where p = (0,m) and y is randomly chosen from a uniform distribution in Znq . Now,
if we substitute yR1 = v, we get c′ = (pb q2c + y · Senc + e)R′ = (pb q2c + (v,−v ·
R−11 S
T ) + e). Here, the distribution on v is uniform in Znq and the distribution
on R−11 ST is uniform in the set of full column rank matrices in Z
n×(`−n)
q . Observe
that the distribution on ((v,−v · R−11 ST ) + e) is similar to the one considered in
Lemma 3 (for the case h = 1) except that there the distribution on Sˆ is random in
Z(`−n)×nq (while here the distribution of SR−T1 is restricted to full row rank matrices
in Z(`−n)×nq ).
When `−n is O(1), the cardinality of the set of full rank matrices in Z(`−n)×nq is
a significant fraction ( 1O(1) ) of the cardinality of the set of all matrices in Z
(`−n)×n
q .
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Therefore, if there exists an algorithm that can efficiently distinguish between the
distribution of ((v,−v ·R−11 ST )+e) = (y ·Senc+e)R′ from the uniform distribution
on Z`q for a non-negligible fraction of choices of S and R1, it can also distinguish
the distribution on (A,B) in Lemma 3 from the uniform one for a non-negligible
fraction of Sˆ (Here, non-negligible means ( 1O(nc) ) for some constant c).
Now, suppose there exist a non-zero message m and an algorithm W that can
distinguish the corresponding distribution of c′ = (pb q2c+ y · Senc + e)R′ from the
distribution of (y · Senc + e)R′ (for a non-negligible fraction of choices of Senc and
R′) then such an algorithm can be used to create an algorithm W ′ that distinguishes
between the distribution on (y ·Senc+ei)R′ and the uniform one. Let pW (m) be the
probability that W returns 1 when the input is sampled from the distribution on c′ =
((0,m)+y ·Senc+e)R′ and let pW (0) be the probability that W returns 1 when the
input is sampled from the distribution on (y·Senc+e)R′. Suppose |pW (0)−pW (m)| >
 for some significant value . Then, either |pW (0) − pW (U)| or |pW (m) − pW (U)|
must be greater than 2 , where pW (U) is the probability that W returns 1 when
the input is sampled from the uniform distribution. If |pW (0) − pW (U)| > 2 then
W ′ is identical to W . Otherwise, W ′ calls the algorithm W after altering its input
by adding (0,m) to it. (These arguments are similar to the arguments in the proof
Lemma 5.4 in [29].) Let cm denote the encryption of a message m under the secret
key S,R1,R2. The above arguments prove that the probability of distinguishing
the distribution of cm(R′′)−1 from that of c0(R′′)−1 for any efficient algorithm is
negligible under the LWE assumption (The probability is taken over the choices of
S and R1 and the randomness involved in the encryption process).
Since R2 is chosen randomly from a uniform distribution, the above arguments
imply that, under the LWE assumption, there exists no efficient algorithm that can
distinguish between encryptions of a non zero message m from the encryptions of
the 0 vector. Now, for an algorithm Wˆ , let pWˆ (m) denote the probability of Wˆ
returning 1 when the input is sampled from the distribution on the encryptions of
m. Clearly, for two distinct message vectors m1 and m2
|pWˆ (m1)− pWˆ (m2)| ≤ |pWˆ (m1)− pWˆ (0)|+ |pWˆ (m2)− pWˆ (0)| (13)
Since, under the LWE assumption, both the terms on the right hand side of the
above equation are negligible for all efficient algorithms, the value of the term on the
left hand side is also negligible. Further, since there exists no efficient algorithm W
such that |pW (0) − pW (U)| is non-negligible, there exists no efficient algorithm Wˆ
such that |pWˆ (0)− pWˆ (U)| is non-negligible. For any message m and algorithm Wˆ
|pWˆ (m)− pWˆ (U)| ≤ |pWˆ (m)− pWˆ (0)|+ |pWˆ (0)− pWˆ (U)|. (14)
Therefore, under the LWE assumption, there exists no efficient algorithm Wˆ such
that |pWˆ (m) − pWˆ (U)| is non-negligible. In other words, there exists no efficient
algorithm that can distinguish the distribution on the encryptions of a message m
from the uniform distribution on Z`q. uunionsq
3.3 Homomorphic Properties
The proposed scheme can be used to homomorphically evaluate a function φ :
{0, 1}τ(`−n) → {0, 1}`−n on ciphertexts c1, . . . , cτ such that φ(c1, . . . , cτ ) yields a
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ciphertext cφ. In the proposed scheme, φ represents an arithmetic circuit over GF (2)
with addition and multiplication gates. We now show how to perform homomorphic
addition and multiplication of two ciphertexts in the proposed scheme.
3.3.1 Addition.
Addition is performed by simply adding the ciphertexts. For some y1,y2 ∈ Znq , if
c1 =
(
p1
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ y1 · Senc + e1
)
R mod q and c2 =
(
p2
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ y2 · Senc + e2
)
R mod q
denote the respective encryptions of m1 and m2, then compute
cadd = c1 + c2 (mod q)
=
(
(p1 + p2)
⌊ q
2
⌋
+ (y1 + y2) · Senc + e1 + e2
)
R (mod q) (15)
where ei = (0, e˜i) for some e˜i ← X `−n for i ∈ {1, 2}. If e˜add := e˜1 + e˜2, then
cadd · Sdec = (m1 +m2)
⌊ q
2
⌋
+ e˜add (mod q)
= (m1 ⊕m2)
⌊ q
2
⌋
− 12 [m1 +m2 − (m1 ⊕m2)] + e˜add (mod q) (16)
If eadd := − 12 [m1 + m2 − (m1 ⊕m2)] + e˜add and ‖e1‖∞ , ‖e2‖∞ ≤ B, then the
magnitude of the noise after addition can be computed as
‖eadd‖∞ =
∥∥∥∥−12 [m1 +m2 − (m1 ⊕m2)] + (e˜1 + e˜2)
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ 1 + 2B (17)
3.3.2 Multiplication.
Given two ciphertexts c1 and c2 that encrypts the messages m1 and m2, homomor-
phic multiplication is performed by using a bilinear map on c1 and c2. This map is
represented by a 3-way tensor M which is provided as the public evaluation key for
multiplication. We now proceed to construct M. All operations are performed over
Q unless stated otherwise. For some x ∈ Q, y = x (mod q) denotes the unique value
in the interval (−q/2, q/2].
Homomorphic multiplication in this scheme uses the fact that given two poly-
nomials f1, f2 ∈ I≤r and an evaluation point z ∈ Zvq , f1(z) · f2(z) = (f1 · f2) (z).
Although f1f2 ∈ I it need not be an element of the subspace I≤r. Instead, it is
an element of the space I≤2r. Let n1 denote the dimension of the subspace I≤2r
and t = n1 + ` − n. We choose (n1 − n) additional points z`+1, . . . ,zt in Zvq such
that every vector in Zn1q can be obtained by evaluating a polynomial in I≤2r at
(z1, . . . ,zn, z`+1, . . . ,zt). Evaluating polynomials in I≤2r on the points z1, z2, . . . ,zt
yields an n1 dimensional subspace of Ztq
Let fmult be a polynomial in I≤r and (fmult(z1), . . . , fmult(z`)) = ymult · Senc
for some ymult ∈ Znq . Then, given encryptions of m1 and m2 viz. c1 and c2, our aim
is to get a ciphertext of the form
cmult =
(
(p1  p2) ·
⌊ q
2
⌋
+ ymult · Senc + emult
)
R mod q ∈ Z`q (18)
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For i := {1, 2}, ciphertexts ci that encrypt messages mi are given as
ci =

fi(z1)
...
fi(zn)
mi,n+1
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ fi(zn+1) + ei,n+1
...
mi,`
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ fi(z`) + ei,`

T
R (mod q) (19)
where fis are polynomials that are randomly sampled from I≤r.
The process of homomorphically multiplying c1 and c2 is done through the fol-
lowing steps.
1. For some K1,j ,K2,j ∈ Z, transform the ciphertexts c1 and c2 to vectors of the
form,
c˜1 =

f1(z1)
...
f1(zn)
m1,n+1
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′1,n+1 + qK1,n+1
...
m1,`
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′1,` + qK1,`

T
, c˜2 =

f2(z1)
...
f2(zn)
m2,n+1
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′2,n+1 + qK2,n+1
...
m2,`
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′2,` + qK2,`

T
∈ Q`
(20)
(Note that the noise terms ei,j have transformed to e′i,j . This is because we de-
liberately introduce some noise in this step. The reason for the same is explained
later in the paper.)
2. For some K1,j ,K2,j ∈ Z for `+1 ≤ j ≤ t, compute values that are equivalent mod
q to evaluations of f1 and f2 at the additional points, z`+1, . . . ,zt and append
these entries to c˜i to generate vectors c′1 and c′2 where
c′1 =

f1(z1)
...
f1(zn)
m1,n+1
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′1,n+1 + qK1,n+1
...
m1,`
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′1,` + qK1,`
f1(z`+1) + qK1,`+1
...
f1(zt) + qK1,t

T
, c′2 =

f2(z1)
...
f2(zn)
m2,n+1
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′2,n+1 + qK2,n+1
...
m2,`
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′2,` + qK2,`
f2(z`+1) + qK2,`+1
...
f2(zt) + qK2,t

T
∈ Qt
(21)
3. Take component-wise product of c′1 and c′2 and multiply the entries containing
the message with 2/q to get
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c′mult=

f1f2(z1)
...
f1f2(zn)
2
q
(
m1,n+1
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′1,n+1 +qK1,n+1
)(
m2,n+1
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′2,n+1 +qK2,n+1
)
...
2
q
(
m1,`
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′1,` + qK1,`
)(
m2,`
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′2,` + qK2,`
)
f1f2(z`+1) + qK`+1
...
f1f2(zt) + qKt

T
(22)
where Kj ∈ Z for `+ 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
4. Add integers equivalent to f1f2(zj) mod q to the jth entries of c′mult for n+ 1 ≤
j ≤ `. Let the resultant vector be c′′mult ∈ Qt such that for n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ `
c′′mult(j) =
2
q
(
m1,j
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′1,j + qK1,j
)(
m2,j
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′2,j + qK2,j
)
+ f1f2(zj) + qKj
(23)
where Kj ∈ Z for n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ `. The remaining entries of c′′mult are the same as
that of c′mult.
5. Transform the vector c′′mult ∈ Qt to a valid ciphertext cmult of size ` over Zq.
We now explain in detail how each of the above steps is performed.
Step 1: The first step is to transform the ciphertexts c1 and c2 to the vectors
c˜1 and c˜2 given in Equation (20). For i := {1, 2}, let Dis be matrices given by
Di = R−1 ·
[
In S
T
0 I`−n
]
+
[
0 i
0 0
]
(24)
=
[
R1
−1 R1−1ST + i
−R2R1−1 −R2R1−1ST + I`−n
]
∈ Q`×` (25)
where is are matrices in Qn×(`−n) such that the one norm of each of their columns
is less that B/q. Observe that, for i := {1, 2} and n + 1 ≤ j ≤ `, 〈ciR−1, s˜j〉 =
mi,j
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ ei,j + qKi,j , where K1,j ,K2,j ∈ Z and the s˜js are as given in Equation
(6). Therefore, for i := {1, 2}, c˜i = ciDi and the error terms e′i,j are given by
e′i,j = ei,j + 〈ci, (i(:, j),0)〉 where 0 ∈ Q`−n is the all zero vector. Both terms in the
right hand side of this equation are bounded by B.
Step 2: Evaluation of polynomials in I≤r at z1, . . . ,zt constitutes an n-
dimensional subspace of Ztq. Therefore, for i ∈ {1, 2} and ` + 1 ≤ k ≤ t, there
exists αk := (α1k, . . . , αnk ) ∈ Znq such that
fi(zk) :=
n∑
j=1
αjk · fi(zj) (mod q) (26)
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Consequently, c′i = c˜i ·A ∈ Qt (this multiplication is performed by considering the
elements of A to be in Q) where A is given by
A :=
 In 0
α1`+1 . . . α
1
t
...
. . .
...
αn`+1 . . . α
n
t
0 I`−n 0
 ∈ Z`×tq (27)
Step 3: c′mult ∈ Qt in Equation (22) is obtained from c′1 and c′2 by taking
their element-wise product and then multiplying the last ` − n elements by 2/q.
This operation can be done by evaluating a tensor U ∈ Qt×t×t on c′1 and c′2. For
1 ≤ i ≤ t, let Ui denote the i-th frontal slice of U . For 1 ≤ i ≤ n and `+ 1 ≤ i ≤ t,
the corresponding matrix Ui, has 1 in the (i, i)-th position and 0 everywhere else.
For n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ `, Ui(i, i) = 2/q and Ui(i, j) = 0 when i 6= j. Therefore,
c′mult =
[
c′1U1c
′
2
T
. . . c′1Utc
′
2
T
] ∈ Qt (28)
Given c˜1 and c˜2 from Step 1, c′mult is obtained by evaluating the following tensor
T ∈ Q`×`×t on c˜1 and c˜2
T = U ×1 A×2 A ∈ Q`×`×t (29)
For example, if n = 2 and ` = 4, then the frontal slices of T for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` can be
represented by the following matrices:
T1 =
1 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , T2 =
0 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , T3 =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 2q 0
0 0 0 0
 , T4 =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2q
 (30)
For `+ 1 ≤ i ≤ t, Ti is a matrix of the form
Ti :=

(α1i )2 α1iα2i . . . α1iαni
...
...
. . .
...
α1iα
n
i α
2
iα
n
i . . . (αni )2
0n×(`−n)
0(`−n)×n 0(`−n)×(`−n)
 ∈ Q`×` (31)
Therefore, given c˜1 and c˜2 from Step 1, we can compute the vector c′mult as:
c′mult := c˜1T c˜T2 =
[
c˜1T1c˜
T
2 · · · c˜1Ttc˜T2
] ∈ Qt (32)
Step 4: The evaluations of polynomials in I≤2r on z1, z2, . . . ,zt consti-
tute an n1-dimensional subspace of Ztq. Because of the way in which the points
(z1, . . . ,zn, z`+1, . . . ,zt) are chosen, the evaluations of f1f2 ∈ I≤2r at the
points (zn+1, . . . ,z`) can be written as a linear combination of its evaluations
at (z1, . . . ,zn, z`+1, . . . ,zt). Therefore, for some (β1j , . . . , βnj , β`+1j , . . . , βtj) ∈ Zn1q ,
n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ `,
f1f2(zj) :=
n∑
i=1
βij · f1f2(zi) +
t∑
i=`+1
βij · f1f2(zi) (mod q) (33)
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Let B1 be a matrix of size n × (` − n) such that B1(i, j) = βij for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
n + 1 ≤ j ≤ `. Similarly, let B2 be a matrix of size (t − `) × (` − n) such that
B2(i, j) = βij for n + 1 ≤ j ≤ ` and ` + 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Consider the following block
matrix
B =
 In B1 00 I`−n 0
0 B2 It−`
 ∈ Zt×tq (34)
c′′mult is obtained by multiplying c′mult with the matrix B i.e. c′′mult = c′mult · B
(considering the elements of B to be in Q).
Step 5: In order to transform the vector c′′mult generated in the above step to a
valid ciphertext cmult we first define a map from I≤2r to I≤r as follows.
Let LM(I) be the set of leading monomials of elements of I. Let LM(I)r+1 :=
{µ1, µ2, . . . , µM} be the set of all monomials of degree r + 1 in LM(I). For each
monomial µi, choose a polynomial gi ∈ I such that the leading term of gi is µi for
1 ≤ i ≤ M . Let G := {g1, . . . , gM} be the set of these polynomials. Given f ∈ I≤2r,
serially divide f by the set of polynomials G using the degree reverse lexicographic
order (At each step divide the remainder obtained in the previous step by the next
gi). Let fG be the final remainder obtained. Note that the map from f to fG is a
linear one.
The above linear map from I≤2r to I≤r naturally gives rise to the following linear
map L from the evaluations of polynomials in I≤2r at (z1, . . . ,zt) to the evaluations
of polynomials in I≤r at (z1, . . . ,z`).
L (f(z1), f(z2), . . . , f(zt)) = (fG(z1), fG(z2), . . . , fG(z`))
Let (f1, . . . , fn1) be a basis for I≤2r and let (f1G , . . . , fn1G ) be the respective
remainders after serially dividing by the elements of G. Let F1 ∈ Zn1×tq and F2 ∈
Zn1×`q be the following matrices,
F1 :=
 f
1(z1) . . . f1(z`) . . . f1(zt)
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
fn1(z1) . . . fn1(z`) . . . fn1(zt)
 , (35)
F2 :=
 f
1
G(z1) . . . f1G(z`)
...
. . .
...
fn1G (z1) . . . f
n1
G (z`)
 (36)
Every Q that satisfies the equation F1 ·Q = F2 (mod q), defines a map LQ from Ztq
to Z`q which when restricted to the evaluations of I≤2r results in L. In particular,
there exist solutions Q that have the following structure,
Q =
[
Qn×n1 0n×(`−n) Q
n×(t−`)
2
Q
(`−n)×n
3 I`−n Q
(`−n)×(t−`)
4
]T
∈ Zt×`q (37)
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Now, when c′′mult is multiplied with the matrix Q (considering the elements of Q
to be in Q) we get the following vector c˜mult
c˜mult=

fmult(z1) + qK ′1
...
fmult(zn) + qK ′n
2
q
(
m1,n+1
⌊
q
2
⌋
+e′1,n+1+qK1,n+1
)(
m2,n+1
⌊
q
2
⌋
+e′2,n+1+qK2,n+1
)
+fmult(zn+1) + qK ′n+1
...
2
q
(
m1,`
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′1,` + qK1,`
)(
m2,`
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e′2,` + qK2,`
)
+fmult(z`) + qK ′`

T
(38)
for some K ′j ∈ Z for 1 ≤ j ≤ `. Here fmult denotes the remainder obtained after
serially dividing f1f2 by the elements of G. Multiplying c˜mult by R gives us a vector
in Q` which when rounded to the closest integer vector is equivalent mod q to a
vector which gives m1 m2 on decryption i.e,
cmult = bc˜mult ·Rc mod q ∈ Z`q (39)
The sequence of steps that transform the pair c1, c2 to c˜multR constitute a
bilinear map from Q`×Q` to Q`. This map, denoted by BM, can be represented by
a 3-way tensor M where M is given by
M = T ×1D1 ×2D2 ×3 (RTQTBT ) ∈ Q`×`×` (40)
The tensor M is the evaluation key for multiplication. If M1, . . . ,M` denote the
frontal slices of M, then using M, cmult can be computed as:
cmult = bBM(c1, c2)c mod q =
[⌊
c1M1c
T
2
⌋ · · · ⌊c1M`cT2 ⌋] mod q ∈ Z`q (41)
Correctness
If fmult(Z) = ymult · Senc for some ymult ∈ Znq and emult =
(0, . . . , 0, emult,n+1, . . . , emult,`) denotes the noise vector, then the resultant cipher-
text after the multiplication process can be written as
cmult =
(
(p1  p2)
⌊ q
2
⌋
+ ymult · Senc + emult
)
·R mod q ∈ Z`q (42)
Then cmult · Sdec = (m1  m2)
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e˜mult (mod q) where e˜mult =
(emult,n+1, . . . , emult,`). The decryption process outputs m1 m2 if ‖emult‖∞ <
bq/2c /2.
Security with multiplicative homomorphism
The entries of the tensor M ∈ Q`×`×` are polynomials in the entries of the matrices
S,R1,R2,Q, the is, the αji s and β
j
i s. Equating these polynomials with a given
instance of the evaluation key results in a system of O(`3) equations in O(`)2 vari-
ables. The αji s, β
j
i s and the entries of the matrix Q depend on the extra t− ` points
that are chosen independent of the secret key. The entries of Q also depend on the
polynomials chosen for the quotienting operation. Therefore, in order to retrieve the
secret key from the evaluation key one would have to solve a system of polynomial
equations. The problem of Polynomial System Solving (PoSSo) is known to be NP-
hard in general. Most multivariate public key schemes rely on the hardness of solving
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this problem. For detailed analysis of this problem, one may refer to [23,22,16,13,1,
3]. Further, the system of equations in this case is underdetermined (as a system of
equations over Q).
Now, the multiplication operation defines an ‘almost’ bilinear map from Z`q ×Z`q
to Z`q (The rounding operations induce some non-linearity). In the absence of the
is, the noiseless encryptions of 0 constitute an invariant subspace of this map. This
could potentially reveal information about the secret key (Although, to the best of
the authors’ knowledge there are no efficient algorithms to extract such subspaces
for all `). The is ensure that this invariance is removed.
Noise in Multiplication
Let us now analyze the noise in the decryption of cmult. Observe that, for n + 1 ≤
j ≤ `, the noise in cmult(j) is same as that in c˜mult(j). If emult,j denotes the noise
in the jth entry of cmult then using Equation (38), we get
emult,j =
q − 1
q
(m1,je′2,j +m2,je′1,j) + (2e′1,j −m1,j)K2,j + (2e′2,j −m2,j)K1,j
− m1,jm2,j2q +
2
q
e′1,je
′
2,j (43)
The most significant term in emult,j is (2e′1,j−m1,j)K2,j+(2e′2,j−m2,j)K1,j where
the Ki,js are generated due to the multiplication of cis with the matrix Di in Step 1.
Observe that the jth entry of ciDi is equal to 〈ciR−1, s˜j〉+ 〈ci, (i(:, j),0)〉 where 0
is the zero vector in Q`−n and 〈ciR−1, s˜j〉 = mi,j
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ ei,j + qKi,j . The magnitude
of Ki,j is bounded by the one norm of R−1s˜j which is O(nq) since ` = O(n). One
could choose the secret key in such a way that the one norms of theR−1s˜js are small.
Alternatively, one could use a slightly modified version of the vector decomposition
techniques given in [6] to limit the values of the |Ki,j |s. Firstly, for a suitable value of
u (which is O(1)), we choose the entries of the is (all of which are less than 1) such
that their binary expressions have less than u bits i.e. these entries can be written
as
∑u
k=1 bk2−k for some bks in {0, 1}. This technique consists of the following two
functions
– BitDecompq,u(v): Given v ∈ Q`, let xi ∈ {0, 1}` be such that v =
∑blog qc
i=−u 2i ·
xi (mod q). Output the vector(
x−u, . . . ,x0, . . . ,xblog qc
) ∈ {0, 1}`(u+dlog qe)
– PowersOfTwoq,u(w): Given w ∈ Z`, output the vector(
2−u ·w, . . . , 2−1 ·w,w, 2 ·w, . . . , 2blog qc ·w) mod q ∈ Q`(u+dlog qe)
It can be easily verified that 〈v,w〉 = 〈BitDecompq,u(v),PowersOfTwoq,u(w)〉 mod q.
Let D˜is be the matrices got by applying BitDecompq,u on the columns of
Dis. Now, instead of multiplying the cis with the Dis, if we multiply the Power-
sOfTwoq,u(ci)s with the respective D˜is, the corresponding Ki,js are given as
Ki,j =
1
q
· 〈PowersOfTwoq,u(ci),BitDecompq,u(Di(:, j))〉 −mi,jbq/2c − e′i,j (44)
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Therefore, their magnitudes can be computed as
|Ki,j | = 1
q
·
∣∣〈PowersOfTwoq,u(ci),BitDecompq,u(Di(:, j))〉−mi,jbq/2c − e′i,j∣∣
≤
∣∣∣〈PowersOfTwoq,u(ci), D˜i(:, j)〉∣∣∣
q
+ 1
≤ 12 ·
∥∥∥D˜i(:, j)∥∥∥
1
+ 1
≤ 12 · (`(u+ dlog q)e)) + 1
= O(n log q) ( Since ` is O(n) and u is O(1)) (45)
To accommodate these changes in the evaluation key, the tensor M can be
modified as:
M = T ×1 D˜ ×2 D˜ ×3 (RTQTBT ) ∈ Q`(u+dlog qe)×`(u+dlog qe)×` (46)
Then, given c1 and c2, cmult can be computed as
cmult = bBM (PowersOfTwoq,u(c1),PowersOfTwoq,u(c2))c mod q ∈ Z`q (47)
Noise Magnitude
If the above mentioned vector decomposition techniques are used then |Ki,j | ≤
O(n log q) for i ∈ {1, 2}. Since,
∣∣e′i,j∣∣ ≤ 2B for i ∈ {1, 2} and B < bq/2c /2 ≤ q/4,
the magnitude of the error after multiplication is as follows:
‖emult‖∞ ≤ 4B + 2(4B + 1) · O(n log q) +
8B2 + 1
q
= O(n log q) ·B (48)
Theorem 2 The proposed scheme with parameters n, q, L,X with |X | ≤ B can eval-
uate circuits of depth L when q/B ≥ (O(n log q))L.
Proof From Lemma 2, noise in a fresh encryption is at most B. After one level of
multiplication, it increases to O(n log q) ·B. If eimult denotes the noise at level i, then∣∣eimult∣∣ = O(n log q) · ∣∣ei−1mult∣∣. Therefore, ∣∣eLmult∣∣ = (O(n log q))L · B. For correctness
of decryption, we need
∣∣eLmult∣∣ ≤ q/4. Hence, q/B ≥ (O(n log q))L. uunionsq
Parameters and Performance
Similar to [21], we choose n = O(λ) to be a fixed parameter and ` = O(n) to be
slightly bigger than n such that ` − n = O(1). The proposed scheme can evaluate
a circuit of depth L as long as q/B ≥ (O(n log q))L. Therefore, we can choose q to
be of bit size O(L logn) similar to [6,4]. Gentry’s bootstrapping theorem [17] states
that if the decryption circuit complexity of an L-homomorphic scheme is less than
L, then there exists a leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Decryption
circuit complexity in the proposed scheme can be bounded by O(logn + log log q)
using similar techniques as in [9]. For L = O(logn), q/B in the proposed scheme is
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quasi-polynomial in n and its security is based on the hardness of LWE for quasi-
polynomial factors given by γ = nO(logn) (since γ = (q/B) · O˜(n)).
The cost of multiplying two ciphertexts is of the order of O(`3 log2 q) = O˜(n3 ·L2)
while that of adding two ciphertexts is O(`). Therefore, the per gate computation of
the leveled FHE scheme is O˜(n3 · L2).
4 Private key to Public key Conversion
The proposed scheme can be converted to a public key scheme as follows. For some
 > 0, let C0 be a list of d = (1 + )(` log q) encryptions of the zero vector un-
der the private key scheme explained earlier in the paper. Let b1, . . . , b`−n be the
standard basis for Z`−nq , i.e., b1 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), b2 = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and so on. Let
cb1 , . . . , cb`−n be the encryptions of these vectors using the private key scheme. Con-
struct a matrix Cpk ∈ Z(`−n)×`q by assigning Cpk(i, :) = cbi for 1 ≤ i ≤ `− n. Then,
the public key is given by pk = (C0,Cpk) and the secret key is same as that of the
private key scheme. The public key scheme can be described in terms of the following
algorithms.
• PK.KeyGen(1λ): It takes the security parameter λ and outputs the public en-
cryption key pk = (C0,Cpk) and the secret decryption key sk = Sdec where
Sdec = R−1 ·
[
S I`−n
]T .
• PK.Encrypt(pk,m): To encrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1}`−n, select a random subset
S of C0 and compute the ciphertext as
c = m ·Cpk +
∑
ci∈S
ci (mod q) (49)
• PK.Decrypt(sk, c): Decryption is performed by computing
m =
⌊
1
bq/2c (c · Sdecmod q)
⌉
mod 2 (50)
If e˜pk = (0, epk) denotes the noise associated with the ciphertext c, then
c · Sdec =
(
m ·Cpk +
∑
ci∈S
ci
)
· Sdec = m ·
⌊ q
2
⌋
+ epk (mod q) (51)
Observe that ‖epk‖∞ ≤ (wt(m) + |S|) · B where wt(m) denotes the weight of
the vector m and |S| denotes the cardinality of the set S. Therefore, the decryption
function outputs m when (wt(m)+ |S|) ·B < q/4. The security of the scheme follows
from the security of the private key scheme and Claim 5.3 in [29] (a special case of
the leftover hash lemma). This claim is restated as follows
Lemma 5 [Claim 5.3 [29]] Let S = {g1, . . . , gd} be some subset of Z`q for some
d ∈ N. Then, for a uniform choice of S, given a hash function hA : {0, 1}d → Z`q
defined as hA(x) = xAT mod q where A(:, j) = gj for 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the expectation of
the statistical distance of the distribution on xAT mod q from uniform has an upper
bound of
√
q`/2d. Further, the probability of this statistical distance being greater than
4
√
q`/2d is upper bounded by 4
√
q`/2d.
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Now, for some  > 0, if d = (1 + )` log q, then
√
q`/2d and 4
√
q`/2d are negligible in
`.
Lemma 6 For parameters n, `, d and X , if there exists an efficient algorithm that
can distinguish between encryptions of any two distinct messages m1 and m2 under
the above described public key scheme, then there exists a message m and an algo-
rithm that can distinguish between encryptions of m under the private key scheme
described in Section 3 and the uniform distribution on Z`q
Proof For 0 ≤ i ≤ d+ `− n, let Pi be the matrix got by taking the first d+ i rows
of pk (P0 = C0). Let Di denote the set of vectors got by taking the sum of subsets
of the rows of Pi i.e., Di := {xPi : x ∈ {0, 1}d+i}. Note that, for j ≤ i, Dj ⊂ Di.
We claim that, for 0 ≤ i ≤ d, there exists no efficient algorithm that can distinguish
between vectors sampled from a uniform distribution on Di and vectors sampled
from a uniform distribution on Z`q. We prove this claim using induction.
For a set S and an algorithm W , let pW (S) be the probability that W returns
1 when the input is sampled from a uniform distribution on S. As a consequence of
Lemma 5, for any algorithm W that takes as input elements of Z`q,
pW (D0)− pW (Z`q) ≤ 2−ω(n) (52)
Assume that the claim is true for i ≤ k. The k + 1-th row of Pk+1 is a random
encryption of the message bk+1. Let D′k be the following set of vectors,
D′k := {Pk+1(:, k + 1) + v |v ∈ Dk} (53)
Clearly Dk+1 := Dk ∪ D′k. Therefore, for any algorithm W
pW (Dk+1) = 12pW (Dk) +
1
2pW (D
′
k) (54)
Therefore,
pW (Dk+1)− pW (Z`q) =
1
2((pW (Dk)− pW (Z
`
q)) + (pW (D′k)− pW (Z`q))) (55)
The term (pW (Dk)− pW (Z`q)) is negligible by the induction assumption. Therefore,
if the LHS term in Equation 55 is non-negligible, then (pW (D′k)− pW (Z`q)) must be
non-negligible. Consider the distribution of vectors v = v1 + v2 where v2 is sampled
from a uniform distribution on Dk. This distribution is uniform if v1 is sampled from
the uniform distribution on Z`q. On the other hand, if v1 is sampled uniformly at
random from the set of encryptions of bk+1 then the distribution of v is uniform in
D′k. Thus, if (pW (D′k)−pW (Z`q)) is non-negligible, then the algorithm W can be used
to distinguish between vectors that are sampled from the uniform distribution on
the encryptions of bk+1 (under the private key scheme) and vectors that are sampled
from the uniform distribution on Z`q. uunionsq
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have described a leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme
which achieves additive and multiplicative homomorphism without key switching,
the security of which depends on the hardness of the LWE problem. This scheme
can be used to encrypt message vectors and the addition and multiplication is done
bit wise. The computation cost per multiplication is O˜(n3 · L2).
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